Bangladesh at the crossroads: what awaits the next government after the ballots are cast

These days, it is difficult to keep up with all that is happening in Bangladesh politics as the Interim Government’s tenure ends and elections approach. This is even more true for those of us not in Bangladesh at this historic moment, and who have to rely on news reports, social media postings, discussions on WhatsApp, and conversations with friends around the world. At the same time, some distance from the day-to-day developments provides some perspective that is helpful in looking at longer term trends.   

In this spirit, I want to look beyond the February elections to some of the challenges that the next government will face as it assumes office. While many analysts have already declared a winner without any votes having been cast or counted, my thoughts are not linked to any specific party or personalities.  

While I assume that forces loyal to the deposed former Prime Minister and her party will do their best to disrupt elections and depress voter turnout, I anticipate that the elections will proceed with minimal difficulty and with broad participation. Therefore, the next government will take office with the legitimacy conferred by a democratic election. Moreover, with the reality of a first past the post electoral system the next government will likely enjoy a comfortable majority in Parliament (even if not with a majority of votes in its favour).   

Regardless of who emerges victorious, the next government will consist of many new faces who have not previously served in Ministerial positions. Even those with such previous experience will not have been in government for almost two decades, and for many of these their best days will be behind them. The next government will also inherit a bureaucracy still recovering from decades of politicisation and accumulation of bad habits that will make many nostalgic for the “good old days” when senior bureaucrats had well deserved reputations for competence. And, at the top of the system will be a Prime Minister who will face the steepest learning curve—never having served in a position of similar responsibility.  

At the same time, the next government will face huge expectations from the electorate which will expect it to deliver on ambitious campaign promises, most related to bread and butter issues, starting with job creation. The incoming administration will inherit a deeply divided country, still recovering from the trauma of the previous regime’s tenure, in particular the bloody long July of 2024. Thousands of supporters of that regime will remain in prison while many others will remain outside the country as fugitives, with legal proceedings continuing against them. The victims of the previous regime will remain in need of material and psychological support. Resources to assist them will be constrained and the demands on the government exchequer will exceed those available to meet these many needs. The next government will own all these problems on day one. 

Internationally, the next government can expect to benefit from the good will of the broad coalition of nations that came together to support Bangladesh’s post August 2024 reforms and transition to democracy. That good will may not be matched by material resources, however, as the international community sees needs far exceeding the funding available for development and humanitarian assistance. India, in particular, will pose a challenge for the next government. On the one hand, it is likely that the Indian government will try to mend fences with Bangladesh post-election (although this might depend on which party emerges victorious). At the same time, bilateral irritants will remain, in particular the presence of so many high-profile fugitives in India and its continued support for the previous ruling party.   

This has engendered popular anger in Bangladesh at India which may limit the next government’s freedom of manoeuvre vis a vis its neighbour. Bangladesh’s next government will also have to balance relations with other great powers who seek influence to advance their bilateral and regional objectives. As with other areas, Bangladesh’s foreign policy and national security bureaucracy post-election will be led by many without significant experience at that level.    

None of these challenges are unique to Bangladesh nor are they insurmountable. At the same time, it would be prudent for those contesting in the elections who hope to form the next government to keep these in mind as they simultaneously prepare their campaigns and their governing plans. There are also some concrete steps the political parties and their well-wishers can take to improve the odds that the next government succeeds.   

First and foremost, the political parties and interim government should agree on the importance of a smooth transition post-election and begin making plans for this handover in the few days between elections and the swearing in of the next government. The interim government can take the first step by setting up its own transition mechanism and designating officials within the various Ministries to begin plans for the handover. Second, the parties (who were part of the pro-democracy coalition that overthrew the previous regime) should agree on rules of the road post-election so that politics does not deteriorate into the recognisable destructive patterns.    

Beyond this, internal and external partners should be prepared to cooperate with whichever government receives a popular mandate. While pre-election there may be preferred outcomes for these outsiders, after elections all should look for ways to work together for the benefit of Bangladesh and its people. There is a time for electoral competition, but there is also a time to put these differences aside to find ways to work towards common goals. This is the best way of avoiding a return to the status quo ante and the best way to ensure that those who want to take Bangladesh backwards are not able to succeed.